Obscenity & Pornography
adapted from THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION
ARTS CENSORSHIP PROJECT NEWSLETTER
Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1995
(deleted text)
Prosecutions Continue: The Ever-Elastic Definitions
of Obscenity & Pornography [4]
As the "culture wars" continue to rage, criminal
prosecutors are expanding their definitions of "obscenity" and "child
pornography" in order to suppress artistic expression that touches
on sexual themes. In past issues of the newsletter, we have described
the Cincinnati, Ohio, prosecution of a gay bookstore for renting
the film Salo, by the Italian director Pier Paolo Pasolini, one
of the towering figures in cinema history; the first federal obscenity
prosecution of an adult computer bulletin board; a "child endangerment"
prosecution of a New Jersey man for nude photos he took of his daughter
as part of an assignment for an art photography class; and a U.S.
Justice Department crusade to expand the federal child pornography
law to cover, for the first time, images of clothed minors, who
are not engaging in any sexual activity, if the images are deemed
to be "lascivious."
The results in these cases so far have been mixed.
Although a local judge refused to dismiss the charges against the
Pink Pyramid bookstore in Cincinnati for renting Salo, he did rule
that the police had illegally seized the film, and therefore could
not use it at trial, therebyeffectively disposing of the case. That
ruling is now on appeal.
In the federal "cybersex" case, U.S. v. Thomas,
the ACLU and a number of other groups concerned with free speech
in cyberspace are preparing to file friend-of-the-court briefs arguing
that the "local community
standards" test for obscenity cannot constitutionally
be applied to a medium that is at once as global, and as private,
as computer bulletin board communications.
The New Jersey "child endangerment" case has been
resolved satisfactorily for the photographer, Ejlat Feuer, if not
in a manner likely to calm the fears of others who photograph child
nudes. After the state court denied a motion to dismiss the indictment,
the New York Times ran two prominent stories about the case, and
substantial additional publicity followed. At this point, the prosecutor
evidently realized that a conviction would be unlikely, given Feuer's
utter lack of pornographic intent, and offered a "pretrial diversion"
program to make the case go away.
U.S. v. Knox, the child pornography case involving
films of clothed minors, had a distressing end when the Supreme
Court declined to hear an appeal from a federal appeals court decision
affirming Knox's conviction. By this time, the Clinton/Reno Justice
Department had completely reversed its initial position that the
federal law at the very least required either actual sexual conduct
or nudity. The politically driven result in this case is that artists,
advertisers, and others who photograph children will have no way
of knowing when a zealous prosecutor may decide to subject them
to criminal charges because she or he considers a fetching picture
of a minor to be "lascivious."
Meanwhile, police and prosecutors in Puerto Rico
have jumped on the expanding obscenity bandwagon in recent months,
filing charges in early January against "Condom Mania," a San Juan
store that sells cards, magazines, and novelties like penis-shaped
gu ns and candies; then, about a month later, charging several music
stores with obscenity for selling rap music whose lyrics address
drugs and police violence as well as sex. The censorship campaign
appears to be orchestrated by Morality in Media, which has close
links to the San Juan Police vice squad. Local ACLU activists are
looking into the possibility of a civil rights lawsuit to restrain
the unconstitutional police conduct.
Supreme Court Ponders Free Speech
Issues;
Results Will Affect Students,Artists, Protesters [5]
The Supreme Court is considering several cases
this term that will have important repercussions for artists and
others exercising First Amendment rights. The ACLU is direct counsel
in one of these cases and is participating as amicus curiae in the
others.
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, which was
argued on March 1, raises a conflict between the principles of free
speech and separation of church and state in the context of student
activity funding at a public university. Wide Awake, an evangelical
Christian paper, was denied student activity funds because university
guidelines prohibited any financial aid to "religious activity."
Wide Awake filed suit, claiming that the university's ban constituted
"viewpoint discrimination" in the operation of a public subsidy
program, since student publications with secular viewpoints on controversial
issues could receive funding.
Wide Awake's argument is significant because government
spends money to support many forms of free expression in addition
to public universities: arts funding, scholarly research, public
parks, theaters, museums, libraries. The ACLU and other free-speech
groups have argued in many cases, and the courts have generally
agreed, that just because the government may be providing support
for an activity does not mean that it may dictate what can or cannot
be said, written, or presented.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,
however, prohibits government from directly supporting religion
with taxpayers' money. The purpose of the Establisment Clause is
to preserve religious freedom by keeping government power away from
private religious choices -- preventing government from either assisting,
or interfering with, particular religions. The ACLU argues in its
brief that this principle of church-state separation mandates an
exception to the usual rule of "viewpoint neutrality" in government
funding programs.
The principle is especially important in this case,
where the lawyers representing Wide Awake are arguing to overturn
decades of Supreme Court precedent invalidating government funding
of parochial schools or other forms of religious indoctrination.
Maintaining the ban on public funding of religion doesn't inhibit
discussion of religious history or beliefs in public school classrooms,
libraries, museums, or anywhere else; it only prevents government
entanglement in religious affairs and the use of government power
to establish the kind of "Christian America" that some politicians
and pressure groups are calling for.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group
of Boston ("GLIB") v. Hurley involves a Massachusetts court ruling
that the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade, sponsored by a private
veterans' group, is actually a "public accommodation" within the
meaning of Massachusetts law, and that the veterans therefore cannot
exclude "GLIB" members from participating in the parade because
of their sexual orientaton. The veterans argue that a court order
telling them whom they may invite or disinvite to their parade violates
their First Amendment right to express their own "traditional values."
In a similar New York case, the ACLU agreed that the First Amendment
protected the right of any group, including a bigoted and homophobic
group, to express its views in a parade.
The Boston case is complicated by the fact that
tradi-tionally, the St. Patrick's Day parade was sponsored by the
city; it was only quite recently, after a gay rights group expressed
its desire to join, that the city delegated the administration of
the parade to a private group. The ACLU's Supreme Court brief thus
argues that the question of government involvement in the veterans'
discrimination should be reconsidered. If there is government involvement,
then discrimination against the gay group based on its viewpoint
would violate the First Amendment. On the other hand, if the parade
is truly privately sponsored, the veterans' First Amendment right
to exclude viewpoints with which they disagree must be protected.
It's worth noting that after the courts upheld
the New York Order of Hibernians' right to exclude gay rights messages
from their parade, most of that city's political leaders chose to
march not with the Hibernians but with an alternative parade that
included gay groups.
In Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette, the
Ohio ACLU is defending the First Amendment right of any group to
express any message it wants, including a religious message, on
government property that has traditionally been a "public forum"
for free speech. In this case, the Ku Klux Klan sought permission
to display a cross in a public park area near the state capitol.
Because the area had long been treated as a public forum for the
expression of all kinds of views, both secular and religious, there
was little danger that the government would be perceived as endorsing
the message of Christianity conveyed by the cross. If there were
such an appearance of endorsement, or if the government owned or
paid for the cross, then permitting religious symbols even in a
public forum would violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
This case is different from Rosenberger v. University
of Virginia (above) because no public funds are being spent directly
to support the religious message. The fact that the Klan wanted
to erect the cross makes the case emotionally charged, but the constitutional
principles shouldn't change simply because a racist or otherwise
disreputable group is seeking to exercise its First Amendment rights.
Kimberlin v. Quinlan involves the question of how
much evidence a plaintiff in a First Amendment case must have about
the motives of the government officials who allegedly violated his
free speech rights. Kimberlin is the federal prisoner who claims
to have sold marijuana to Dan Quayle, and who was placed in administrative
segregation when the press wanted to interview him about his allegations.
Whether the prison officials violated his free speech rights depends
on their motivation for placing him in segregation: if their intent
was to silence him, then their action was unconstitutional.
The problem for Kimberlin, as for many others who
claim First Amendment violations because of censorship, is that
direct evidence of a government official's state of mind is often
hard to come by. Requiring plaintiffs at the outset of a lawsuit
to produce such evidence, as the lower court did in this case, will
defeat many meritorious claims and leave victims of censorship without
judicial remedies. The ACLU's brief argues that no higher threshold
ought to apply to First Amendment cases than to any others.
On February 21, the Supreme Court decided Lebron
v. Amtrak. The Court ruled that Amtrak, which was created by the
federal government, and is government-financed and controlled, is
the equivalent of a government agency and thus must abide by First
Amendment standards. Amtrak had refused artist Michael Lebron permission
to purchase advertising display space in New York's Penn Station
because of the controversial content of his artwork attacking the
Coor's Beer Company for supporting the Nicaraguan Contras. The case
now goes back to the U.S. Court of Appeals to decide whether Amtrak's
censorship of Lebron's art violated his First Amendment rights.
ACLU Opens Forum on America Online [9]
ACLU Arts Censorship Project
132 W. 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036
(212) 944-9800, Ext. 704, 706
Project Director: Marjorie Heins
Staff Assistant: Kenia Olivera
Funding for the Project is provided by the Nathan
Cummings Foundation, the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Nathan Tannenbaum Foundation, and the Albert A.
List Foundation.
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